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GREENFELD v. HOOK
"BOULEVARD STOP" STREETS IN MARYLAND
Greenjeld v. Hook'
Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries received as a re-
sult of an automobile collision. Defendant was travelling
South on Eutaw Place, a designated boulevard, which had
its respective lanes divided by a parkway, when he ran
into plaintiff's car at the intersection of Eutaw Place and
Lafayette Avenue. Plaintiff was travelling West on La-
fayette Avenue; she had stopped and looked to her right
both before crossing the North-bound lane and before en-
tering the South-bound one of Eutaw Place. The general
theory of plaintiff's case, and of the prayers granted at
the trial on behalf of the plaintiff was that defendant's
right of way was not absolute and that "persons when op-
erating their vehicles upon through or boulevard streets
[are duty bound] to keep the same under reasonable con-
trol and to have the speed of the automobile so reduced
in approaching crossings as to have the same under rea-
sonable control".'
A Maryland statute3 provides for the establishment
of through streets. By the terms of the statute, all vehi-
cles entering highways designated by "stop" signs must
stop and "yield the right of way to all vehicles approach-
ing on such highway" unless traffic at the intersection is
controlled by an officer or by a signal.
On appeal, after a verdict and judgment for plaintiff,
the case was reversed and remanded for error in the in-
struction which was held contrary to the statutory design.
The purpose of the statute was "to accelerate the flow
of traffic over through highways by permitting travellers
thereon to proceed within lawful speed limits without in-
terruption." But the rights of the driver on the favored
highway have been the subject of judicial controversy.
Some cases have taken the view that such a driver must
slow down at intersections. The opinion of the Court,
which carefully reviews the law, characterized that view
as frustrating the purpose of the statute. The intended
benefit is uninterrupted travel. It would be contrary to
this purpose to require the traveller to slow down at every
intersection. On the contrary, the motorist on the favored
18 A. (2d) 888 (31d. 1939).
Ibid., 890. Italics supplied.
.Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 209.
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highway should be entitled to expect those entering at
intersections to stop and yield the right of way.
Cases involving the rights of way of motorists may be
divided into five classes. The first two classes involve
fixed wheel vehicles (streetcars and trains) and pedes-
trians; neither of these enter into the present discussion.
The remaining three classes are defined in terms of the
type of intersection involved; the first of these is the or-
dinary uncontrolled intersection; next is the stop and go
signal corner; and the third is the boulevard stop or
through street intersection.
The right of way at ordinary uncontrolled intersec-
tions is relative. In Warner v. Markoe,l the rule was thus
summarized:
"It is a rule that applies only in appropriate cir-
cumstances, that is, when the two drivers come to
the crossing in such proximity in point of time as to
require accommodation of one to the other. * * * De-
termination of the right of way, thus left to the driv-
ers, in each instance, commonly involves the exer-
cise of some judgment, the driver from the left be-
ing required to yield to avoid apparent chances of col-
lision; and the fact should to some extent influence
the driving of the car from the right. For one com-
ing from the left may expect to have cars from the
right approach under control in compliance with sec-
tion 209 of article 56 of the Code, as amended, and
taking care to avoid traffic from its own right as well
as traffic from the left which might be ahead of it
at the crossing; ana the driving from the left is like-
ly to be governed accordingly."
The law relating to intersections controlled by traf-
fic lights (and other forms of signals) is sharply differen-
tiated from the rule above expressed. At such intersec-
tions, the driver having the green light or "go" signal
seems to have an absolute right of way and this without
regard to his speed. In Sun Cab v. Faulkner,5 the Court,
speaking through Chief Judge Bond, said:
"The case is unlike those in which, there being
no signals, by lights or by traffic officers, two drivers
4 171 Md. 351, 357, 189 A. 260, 262 (1937).
5 163 Md. 477, 478-9, 163 A. 194 (1982).
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approaching each other on intersecting streets have
the burden of determining which has the right to cross
unobstructed by the other. In those cases there is
commonly a question of the exercise of due care on
the part of one driver or the other in deciding to cross
when he did, but in the present case no such question
is present....
If negligence is found in the rate of speed at which
the Sun cab was being driven, that fact alone does
not, of course, answer the question of liability. The
negligence must have been the cause of the collision.
. . . There would be no foundation in fact here for
a holding that by driving at a reduced speed the Sun
Company driver might have avoided the collision after
the two cabs came within sight of each other. The
contribution of the Sun cab to the accident appears
to have been only that of being there at the moment,
a circumstance which might have arisen with or with-
out negligence in approaching the place. But taking
it as proved that there was negligence in the rate of
speed in this instance, that negligence, in the approach
must be found to have been the cause of the collision,
or there can be no legal responsibility for it on the
Sun Company's part."
The law with respect to through streets has wavered
between these two extremes. At first, the Court seemed
inclined to treat intersections marked by boulevard stop
signs in the same manner as intersections controlled by
traffic signals.
In Motor Tours v. Becker,' plaintiff, a passenger of a
bus, sued the bus company for injuries received when the
bus collided with a taxi. The bus was proceeding east on
Fayette Street, a designated boulevard, when the taxi
emerged at Washington Street. The taxi's brakes failed
to operate. Both drivers were evidently exceeding the
speed limit. At the trial, plaintiff recovered, and on ap-
peal the judgment was reversed on the ground that the
evidence had not shown the bus's speed to be the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. The Court there said:
"While relying upon the protection which the traf-
fic sign was intended to afford for his right of way,
the bus driver had no reason to anticipate and guard
'165 Md. 32, 166 A. 434 (1933).
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against such contingencies as those to which the ac-
cident in this case must be attributed, and to which
the speed of the bus had no relation."7
In Blinder v. Monaghan,8 plaintiff was occupant of a
taxicab which entered Charles Street at 32nd Street, and
there collided with a truck. Plaintiff sued the cab com-
pany to recover for the injuries received. The cab driver
testified that his view of the truck had been obstructed by
a United Railway Bus which had stopped to discharge
passengers. Defendant further contended that the truck
was proceeding at an excessive speed. The Court there
held that, regardless of the truck's speed, the cab had no
right to interfere with traffic on the boulevard. The stat-
ute expressly requires persons entering through streets
to yield to traffic on such streets.
".... Where, as in this case, the operator of a vehi-
cle enters such a highway in disregard of these ex-
plicit and mandatory rules, and collides with another
vehicle approaching thereon, the collision can only
be attributed to his negligence ... "9
The case of Carlin v. Worthington,0 is very difficult
to reconcile with the Monaghan case. The following lan-
guage quoted from the Worthington case seems to incline
towards the rule applicable to ordinary intersections; it
seems to make the rights of the drivers relative:
"The rights, duties, and privileges of motorists on
favored and unfavored highways is discussed at con-
siderable length in the notes in 58 A. L. R. 1198, 81
A. L. R. 185, and 89 A. L. R. 838. Preferences in cer-
tain streets or highways must be created by statute
or ordinance (cases cited), and in this state they are,
by section 209, article 56 of the Code. The weight of
authority seems to be that the right of a driver on
a favored highway is not absolute, but is to be en-
joyed with due regard to the circumstances then and
there existing, particularly as to speed and distances
of the respective cars from the intersection when in
sight of each other .... A 'stop' sign means stop be-
165 Md. 32, 36, 166 A. 434, 435 (1933).
8 171 Md. 77. 188 A. 31 (1936).
171 Md. 77, 84, 188 A. 31 (1936).
" 172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356 (1937).
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fore entering a boulevard or favored highway (cases
cited), and an unfavored driver must not enter against
a favored driver arriving at the intersection at the
same time. When the unfavored driver has time, if
the favored is so far from the intersection that he will
not arrive there before the crossing is cleared by the
other, if he is not speeding, it is not negligence of an
unfavored driver to enter.""
In the case under discussion the Court finally decided
that intersections at arterial highways are to be treated
very nearly like intersections controlled by traffic signals.
The opinion explained away the apparent inconsistency
of the Carlin case on the ground that it related solely to
the question of proximate cause and not to the relative
rights at intersections:
"... In Carlin v. Worthington the Court was sus-
tained in refusing a rule of the road prayer because
it failed to require the jury to find that defendant's
failure to stop before entering the boulevard was the
proximate cause of the accident. Both [the Carlin case
and the Monoghan case] agree upon the principle that
a driver on an unfavored highway who enters a fa-
vored highway must be prepared to yield the right of
way to a traveller on the favored highway, and must
allow him to proceed, and applies to travellers in such
a situation the severest rule known to the common
law of America, the 'Stop, look and listen' rule ap-
plicable to railway crossings.12
Since the Greenfeld case, the court has reiterated its
view in Pegelow v. Johnson.3 There, one of the prayers
granted for defendant was based on the theory that the
favored driver must slow down at intersections. This case
was reversed on appeal and Greenfeld v. Hook, and the
matter therein quoted from the Carlin case were quoted
at length as authority:
"It is not negligent for a driver on a primary or
favored highway to assume that a driver on a sec-
ondary or unfavored highway, marked by a stop sign,
will stop and allow him to proceed. (Cases cited).
1172 Md. 505, 508, 192 A. 356, 358 (1937).
128 A. (2d) 88, 894 (Md. 1939).
13 Baltimore Daily Record, December 23, 1989 (Md. 1939).
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"It is the application by statute of the old 'stop,
look and listen' rule with respect to railways, which
is, as stated in Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. vs. Hoge-
land, 66 Md. 149, 161, 7 A. 105, 107. 'It is negligence
per se for any person to attempt to cross tracks of a
railroad without first looking and listening for ap-
proaching trains; and, if the track in both directions
is not fully in view in the immediate approach to the
point of intersection of the roads, due care would re-
quire that the party wishing to cross the railroad track
should stop, look and listen before attempting to
cross'."
14
But, the right of the favored traveller is not absolute.
Blashfield under the caption "Care on Arterial Highways,"
says: 15
"Motorist on arterial highway protected by stop
sign must drive with reasonable care, as to traffic
entering from side streets"
and cites as authority Johnston v. Selfe.16 The cases cited
by that author in his 1939 supplement indicate that this
statement of the law is generally accepted. The motorist
is not required to slow down, but at the same time, the
law will not protect the favored driver who exercises his
right recklessly. The unfavored driver does not unquali-
fiedly enter the boulevard at his peril.
Berry states the rule more precisely. 7 He says that
the traveller on the favored street may assume that the
traveller on the unfavored street will yield until, in the
exercise of ordinary discretion he should discover that his
assumption is erroneous.
The rules above expressed are followed with varying
degrees of exactness in cases and articles. The Nebraska
Law Bulletin"8 takes the view that the right conferred by
statute is not absolute, but that the favored driver must slow
down if necessary to avoid accident. In Vance v. Poree9
it was held that the privilege is not an absolute one, "and
it must be exercised with due regard to the right of other
1, 8 A. (2d) 888, 894 (Md. 1939) quoting from Carlin v. Worthington,
172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356, 357 (1937).
152 BLASHFIELD," CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW (1931) 188, See. 1024,
n. 20.
16 190 Minn. 269, 251 N. W. 525.
3 BERRY, AvrroMonnmER (1935) 89,. Sec. 3.29.1 9Right of Motorit on Arterial Hift gfay. (1930) 9 Nebr. L. Bull. 194.
195 La. App. 309 (1926).
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vehicles to use the intersecting streets." Kentucky went
perhaps a little too far in Bradley v. Schmidt20 wherein
it is held that the unfavored motorist need not yield "ex-
cept when two vehicles arrive at intersection at same
time," and this, even though the failure to yield might, to
some degree, interfere with travel on the highway. The
Boston University Law Review 2' in commenting on Hig-
gens v. Ledo22 says "a driver who has the right of way
is not relieved of the duty of watching out actively for
his own safety and the safety of others." The Uniform
Act Regulating Traffic on Highways23 is worded very
nearly like the Maryland Statute. The cases under the
act are in accord with the Maryland view.
The Maryland law, in its present state, imposes the
following duties and liabilities on parties entering and
travelling on "stop" streets: The party entering the street
must stop2 and yield to all traffic in the highway. He has
the duty ". . . to exercise reasonable care and diligence
to discover whether traffic thereon is approaching the in-
tersection, and, having entered the intersection to yield
the right of way to such traffic, by permitting it to proceed
without interruption, and that duty persists throughout
his passage across the favored way. "25 A failure to comply
with this duty renders the driver liable for all damages
proximately caused by his conduct.
The favored driver does not have an absolute right. He
is entitled to assume that motorists on intersecting streets
will stop and yield the right-of-way. Yet, he must exer-
cise care commensurate with the circumstances; he should
make reasonable allowance for curves, fog, and other con-
tingencies. He is expected to obey the speed laws and he
is of course subject to directions of traffic signals and traf-
fic officers. He, too, is liable for the proximate conse-
quences of his non-compliance.
These rights, duties and liabilities make reasonable al-
lowance for the intended benefits of the statute and at the
20223 Ky. 784, 4 S. W. (2d) 703, 57 A. L. R. 1100 (1928).
21 (1934) 14 Bost. U. L. Rev. 155.
2266 F. (2d) 265 (1933).
21 Se.c 48; 11 U. L. A. 46, 47.
"1 For a discussion of the technical question of where the unfavored
driver must stop, see the report of the oral instruction of Frank, J., in the
trial court case of Webb v. Martin, Baltimore Daily Record, February 5,
1938, to the effect that: ".. . the place to stop is not at the stop sign ... ,
but Just -before entering the intersection, and that, of course, would be
at or about the curb-line.
"38 A. (2d) 888, 895 (Md. 1939).
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same time they subject the parties to that degree of re-
sponsibility necessary for public safety. The result rep-
resents a balance between the conflicting public interests
in speed and security.20
Book Review
CRIMINAL APPEALs IN AMMCA. By Lester Bernhardt
Orfield. Boston. Little, Brown and Co., 1939. Pp. 321.
$5.00. Published in the Judicial Administration Series,
under the auspices of the National Conference of Judicial
Councils.
This extremely informative and forward-looking book
by Professor Orfield of the University of Nebraska College
of Law is the first in the "Judicial Administration Series"
which is being sponsored by the National Conference of
Judicial Councils. Two other books in the series have
been announced to follow Mr. Orfield's one, both to be
written by former Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard
Law School, who is serving as Director of the Conference.
These forthcoming books are to deal, respectively, with
"The Organization of Courts" and "Appellate Procedure
in Civil Cases."
Mr. Orfield acknowledges his indebtedness respectively
for assistance and encouragement to Dean Pound (who
wrote the ten page introduction to the book) and to Hon.
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, currently chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Conference, and former President of the
American Bar Association. He also points out that he be-
gan the project while holding the Brandeis Research Fel-
lowship at the Harvard Law School, that he there profited
by the advice and assistance of Professor Sam Bass War-
ner, and that the Carnegie Corporation made a grant which
made the book possible. Many of the chapters had al-
ready appeared in the form of law review articles.
26 It is interesting to note in this connection the analogy drawn by the
Court between this class of cases and that involving fixed-wheel vehicles.
The severity of the burden placed on motorists crossing railroad or street-
car tracks may be gathered from the following Maryland cases: Balti-
more Transit Co. v. Bramble, 175 Md. 334, 2 A. (2d) 416 (1938); Balti-
more Transit Co. v. Lewis, 174 Md. 618, 190 A. 879 (1938) and other
cases cited in the last-named case.
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